Within Chad's Zaghawa communities especially the Bideyat or Béri people the opponents of President Mahamat Kaka are trying to capitalise on the El Fasher fight...
They say that Hemeti's military strength depends on President Mahamat Kaka helping the United Arab Emirates transport arms to the RSF as documented by the New York Times last month (AC Vol 65 No 15 As the civil war threatens the region the UAE boosts Hemeti's militia)...
In February Mahamat Kaka's cousin and political rival Yaya Dillo Djérou was killed in a clash with the FIR that his supporters say was a targeted assassination (AC Vol 65 No 6 Kaka paves a hard road to sham poll)...
Ousmane also insists that his followers are willing to return to Chad and make Mahamat Kaka pay for his support for Hemeti...
These splits within the Zaghawa over alignments in Darfur are threatening Mahamat Kaka...
A senior security official from the Abu Dhabi government accompanied Mahamat Kaka on his trip to meet France's President Emmanuel Macron last year (AC Vol 64 No 23 Presidents Mahamat Kaka and Macron meet on security threats)...
All this has encouraged political factions wanting to overthrow Mahamat Kaka to form a broad-based opposition in Chad...
Minni Minawi the leader of the Sudanese Liberation Army was invited to Paris by France's Direction Générale sécurité de la extérieure (DGSE) which has hosted Mahamat Kaka and his Emirati security advisor last October...
After that Minawi went to Nigeria for a lengthy meeting with emissaries of Mahamat Kaka...
These efforts to engineer some kind of rapprochement between the Darfur leaders and Mahamat Kaka suggest that the UAE which is coming under growing pressure behind the scenes may start to rein in its support for Hemeti...
If that happens Mahamat Kaka could lose both his sponsorship from Abu Dhabi and the ability to pay off his opponents...
This may explain why in recent weeks Mahamat Kaka has warmed up relations with France and the United States...
The sacking of Idriss Youssouf Boy (IYB) who headed Mahamat Kaka's office at the presidency seems to be collateral damage for this latest policy shift...
A close friend and confidant of Mahamat Kaka's since childhood IYB's loyalty to the President prompted opponents to nickname him 'Makambo'...
IYB was Mahamat Kaka's private secretary from April 2021 to June 2022...
By dismissing his close ally IYB Mahamat Kaka may want to acknowledge the Zaghawa criticism of his alliance with Abu Dhabi; and that he is not a prisoner of this policy...
Mahamat Kaka might also have wanted to make concessions to those western governments criticising IYB's handling of public finances and involvement in embezzlement and trafficking...
When Mahamat Kaka visited the Elysée Palace in February he was told that IYB was not welcome...
Now in disgrace IYB is being targeted by his foes as responsible for the multiple failures of Mahamat Kaka's rule since 2021...
Should Mahamat Kaka want to play the populist card tilting to an anti-western stance again ahead of the parliamentary elections in December IYB would be a useful apparatchik...