PREVIEW
The collapse of negotiations offers some stark choices as President Tshisekedi’s position weakens further
A week of diplomatic spats and foiled negotiations has handed more political weight to the M23 militia and its Rwandan backers to add to their string of victories on the battlefield, as they eye targets to the west and south-east in Congo-Kinshasa. The M23’s boycott of the Luanda talks on 18 March raises more questions about the plan by Angolan President João Lourenço and the African Union to secure a ceasefire, ahead of talks on devolution and land rights.
M23 commanders, having captured Goma and Bukavu, see no value in a truce (AC Vol 66 No 4, As Kinshasa fumes, Kigali plots its next move & Dispatches 18/2/25, Silence in Addis as M23 takes Bukavu). So far, the M23 has faced little resistance from the Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo (FARDC) and its local allies. With superior technology (notably military drones), training and intelligence from the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF), perhaps the most significant obstacles to a march on Kinshasa are logistical overreach and the vast distances.
More and more, the situation resembles Rwanda’s and Uganda’s 1997 war plan, when they marched across the country with Laurent-Désiré Kabila’s Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre (AFDL) to topple Mobutu Sese Seko. This time, however, Uganda plays a smaller role, with President Yoweri Museveni maintaining a cautious alliance with the Tshisekedi government in Kinshasa. Meanwhile, his son and heir apparent, General Muhoozi Kainerugaba, enthusiastically backs Rwanda’s Paul Kagame and the M23, portraying them as liberating forces across Africa (AC Vol 66 No 3, The Muhoozi succession recasts Kampala’s regional policy). Kabila’s 2025 stand-in, Corneille Nangaa, leads the Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC), the M23’s political wing.
A former head of Congo’s compromised electoral commission, which fixed the 2019 elections with backing from the United States and the European Commission to secure Tshisekedi’s presidency, Nangaa has garnered little support within the country. Currently, the focus is less on political popularity and more on military strength – an area where the M23 and Nangaa hold the advantage.
Tshisekedi initially agreed to send a delegation to the Luanda peace talks due to the FARDC’s poor battlefield performance in eastern Congo-K, and the failure of a Southern African Development Community (SADC) military deployment (SAMIDRC) to change the course of the conflict. The Southern African contingent announced a phased withdrawal from Congo-K on 13 March (Dispatches 17/3/25, Southern African militaries call time on their ill-fated Kivu operation).
Isolated
Congo-K’s continuing defeats in the east have exposed Tshisekedi’s lack of international support for refusing talks with M23. Meanwhile, Rwanda’s denials of its troops involvement in the region remain widely disbelieved.
The agenda of any return to the Luanda talks is uncertain. A key issue is the M23’s demand for communal land for North Kivu’s Kinyarwanda-speaking population, particularly its Tutsi community, which would require reallocating land from the Hunde chefferies.
Such a move by Kinshasa would be condemned by Hunde politicians as rewarding foreign-backed aggression at their expense, likely triggering a resurgence of Hunde militia activity against both the M23 and the Congolese government. Even in the most optimistic scenario, negotiating land transfers for peace would be a protracted and challenging process, with no indication that the Congolese government is prepared to undertake it.
Life for ordinary citizens in Goma and Bukavu remains dire. The M23 is forcibly recruiting, targeting schools in Goma for child soldiers and abducting people from hospitals, often for combat or execution following flimsy accusations. Banks in both cities remain shut, causing chronic shortages of Congolese francs and US dollars. Adding to the strain, M23 troops are robbing civilians at roadblocks.
Having secured control of Goma and Bukavu, the capitals of North and South Kivu, the M23/RDF are moving to expand their gains southwards and westwards. Sporadic fighting continues around Uvira, a South Kivu town near Bujumbura, Burundi’s capital. The clashes, principally between M23/RDF and Congolese militia dubbed Wazalendo (patriots) by Kinshasa, see minimal involvement from the FARDC. Despite being heavily outgunned, the Wazalendo have thus far prevented the M23/RDF from capturing Uvira.
Pushing west
The M23/RDF’s westward push has been more effective, with their forces crossing into North Kivu’s Walikale territory last weekend. This advance has forced Alphamin Resources, listed in Johannesburg and Toronto, to halt operations at its high-grade tin mine in the area, causing its share price to plummet and driving up global tin prices (AC Vol 66 No 4, As Kinshasa fumes, Kigali plots its next move).
If the M23/RDF were able to advance westwards from Walikale, their next likely targets are Kisangani, the capital of Tshopo Province or Kindu, the capital of Maniema. Kindu appears the more likely choice, since any move towards Kisangani would likely face opposition from the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF), which is steadily increasing its presence in northern North Kivu and Ituri Province.
A railway directly connects Kindu to Lubumbashi in country’s south-east. Its capture would not only alarm international mining companies operating in Haut Katanga and Lualaba but could also trigger the fall of Tshisekedi’s government.
KAMPALA AND ABU DHABI FOLLOW THE GOLD TRAIL
The collapse of Primera, the United Arab Emirates’s gold trading joint venture with the Congo-Kinshasa government, has encouraged Abu Dhabi to shift its strategy in a bid to maintain a near-monopoly on smuggled African gold. Industry experts say this may explain the UAE’s growing support for Rwanda and Uganda in Congo – to keep the gold flowing.
Gasabo Gold Refinery and Uganda’s African Gold Refinery, owned by Belgian gold trader Alain Goetz, who was sanctioned by the United States Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control in March 2022 (AC Vol 63 No 16, Once silenced, twice shy & Vol 58 No 25, Probing the gold), both send their finished products to Dubai. The Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) has collaborated with the UAE government on security and gold interests in Mali.
The UAE holds substantial investments in Congo-K, notably in the Banana deepwater port, currently under construction by DP World, with additional funding from the United Kingdom’s British International Investment Plc. These investments could be jeopardised if the UAE government openly backs Rwanda’s President Paul Kagame.
The Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) has long operated in north-eastern Congo-K under the guise of fighting the Allied Democratic Forces, now rebranded as the Islamic State Central Africa Province, through what Uganda calls Operation Shujaa.
The UPDF has deployed to Lubero in northern North Kivu, effectively blocking the northwards expansion of the M23 and RDF. Troops have also recently been stationed in Butembo and the Ituri Province capital, Bunia. Unlike the RDF/M23, the UPDF has not displaced Congolese civilian and military authorities in its areas of operation and is, for now, regarded as an ally rather than an adversary.
General Muhoozi Kainerugaba, Uganda’s Chief of the Defence Force in Uganda and President Yoweri Museveni’s son and dauphin, was tweeting in February and March showing sympathy for the M23 and hinting at an alliance with them. But Museveni’s influential brother Salim Saleh opposes both the M23 and Kainerugaba’s potential presidency. Both Saleh and Kainerugaba may support Ugandan military backing for the predominantly Hema Zaïre militia in Ituri, while also aiming to strengthen UPDF control over gold mines near their deployment areas in Congolese towns.
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